Response to my commentator by Wein, Sheldon
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10
May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM
Response to my commentator
Sheldon Wein
Saint Mary's University, Department of Philosophy and International Development Studies Program
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Reply is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact
scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Sheldon Wein, "Response to my commentator" (May 22, 2013). OSSA Conference Archive. Paper 173.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/173
 Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-2. 
Response to my Commentator 
 
SHELDON WEIN 
 
Department of Philosophy and International Development Studies Program  
Saint Mary's University 
Halifax, NS 
Canada, B3H 3C3 
sheldon.wein@gmail.com 
 
 
All zero tolerance arguments (both fallacious and non-fallacious ones) take the 
standard form of practical reasoning (or pragmatic argumentation). And Lewiński’s 
formulation of such arguments is perfectly acceptable: 
 
I. Y (a social goal) is desirable. 
II. X leads to Y. 
Ergo:  
III. We should do X. 
 
And he is certainly correct in claiming the causal premise (II. above) is usually the 
important one and I am happy to accept his formulation of that premise (X is the 
best, that is, most cost effective, means to achieving Y). And I accept Lewiński’s points 
that more needs to be done to characterize the idea of “best means” of achieving 
something. For instance, I see now that I was implicitly assuming that both those 
advancing the argument and their audience would agree on what side constrains 
had to be avoided in order for some means to count as “the best” in the 
circumstances, so that when doing a cost-benefit analysis one excluded all those 
means that involved (say) serious human rights violations. Of course, in many 
situations that assumption does not hold. 
 The important point is that when one looks at zero tolerance arguments this 
way, my view is that good zero tolerance arguments are those which at least 
approach closely enough an adequate account of why each of the six features (full 
enforcement, a lack of prosecutorial discretion, a strict constructivist interpretation, 
strict liability, mandatory punishment, and a harsh punishment) is needed to 
achieve the end in the best (most cost-effective) means. And, since in most cases 
where people advance arguments that a zero tolerance policy is needed to deal with 
a social problem they fail to come even close to saying the six conditions, in most 
cases where one argues for a zero tolerance problem one is committing the zero 
tolerance fallacy. 
Lewiński raises the question of whether we should allow that some 
arguments for unworthy goals should be given a laudatory title such as “good” or 
“valid”. On this matter I side with those that are willing to hold that good arguments 
can be produced for bad ends. It might be that there is a good argument for me to 
abandon my children—they deprive me of things I value (money, my sanity, 
sleep!)—yet, of course, were I to act on this good argument I would be doing 
something quite wrong. So, just as we can talk sensible about a good assassin (one 
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who ensures her victim dies), we can talk about good zero tolerance policies for evil 
ends. Of course, we ought to work to rid the world of assassins (and especially of the 
“good” ones). And, that a zero tolerance policy is the best means of achieving an end 
which is itself evil is all the more reason to avoid adopting that zero tolerance policy. 
(This is one of those situations where it might be wise to say that such an argument 
committed the zero tolerance fallacy, even if one knew that it did not.) 
 
 
 
 
 
